主讲人

（单位）

陈静

(Faculty of Management, Dalhousie University)

主持人

（单位）

何勇

（h片 ）

讲座时间

2026年4月22日15:00

讲座地点

经管楼B201会议室

主讲人简介

Jing CHEN is the William A.Black Chair in Commerce and a professor in the Department of   Management Science & Information Systems at the Faculty of Management, Dalhousie University. She received  her Ph.D. in Management Science from the Richard Ivey School of Business at the University of Western Ontario. Her research interests include competitive channel and supply chain management, the interface between operations management and   marketing, and customer returns. She has published over 100 papers in prestigious journals, including Production and Operations Management, Journal   of Retailing, European Journal of Operational Researc, Decision Sciences, The International Journal of Management Science (OMEGA),   Naval Research Logistics, IISE Transactions, and Transportation Research Part E. Currently, she serves as an Associate Editor for The  International Journal of Management Science (OMEGA), The Journal of   the Operational Research Society (JORS), IEEE Transactions on  Engineering Management(TEM),and International Transactions in Operational Research (ITOR). She has also published more than 20 Ivey business cases.

讲座内容摘要

The study examines how a manufacturer’s production economies of scale affect its   incentive to encroach on the retail market when the direct channel is   organized either centrally or through a decentralized direct-channel division. Encroachment can expand total output and lower average production   cost, but it also reallocates sales across channels and alters downstream   incentives. We show that economies of scale do not uniformly favor   encroachment; rather, their effect depends fundamentally on who controls the   direct channel. Under no encroachment and under decentralized encroachment,   stronger economies of scale always increase the manufacturer’s profit and do   not harm the retailer. Under centralized encroachment, however, stronger   economies of scale can reduce the profits of both firms by shifting volume   from the relatively efficient retail channel to the manufacturer’s more   costly direct channel. We further show that the profitability of encroachment   is asymmetric across organizational structures: centralized encroachment may  underperform no encroachment when economies of scale are strong, whereas decentralized encroachment may do so when economies of scale are weak. From   the retailer’s perspective, stronger economies of scale always reduce   retailer profit under centralized encroachment, but under decentralized encroachment they increase the likelihood that the retailer benefits from   encroachment. Finally, when the manufacturer can choose its internal structure, it prefers centralization when economies of scale are weak or the direct-selling cost is sufficiently low, and decentralization otherwise.   These findings identify organizational structure as the key mechanism through which the same upstream cost force reshapes channel outcomes.